Who is Afraid of the Aarhus Convention? by Jans, Jan
  
 University of Groningen
Who is Afraid of the Aarhus Convention?
Jans, Jan
Published in:
Review of European Administrative Law
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2015
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Jans, J. (2015). Who is Afraid of the Aarhus Convention? Review of European Administrative Law, 7(1), 1-
3.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
From the Editors
Who is afraid of the Aarhus Convention? With its recent
judgment in the Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Natuur en Milieu cases
(Cases C-401 to 403/12) the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
once again, blocked an attempt to improve the legal position of environmental
NGO’s seeking administrative and/or judicial review of decisions of the EU
institutions affecting the environment. The complicated problems regarding
locus standi at the Court of Justice challenging acts of the European institutions
are well documented (cf. the editorial in REALaw 2011/1). The cause of all this?
The requirement of Article 263(4) TFEU of direct and individual concern, as it
has been interpreted by the CJEU since many years. The leading ‘environmental’
case on the admissibility of interested third parties trying to annul decisions of
the EU institutions affecting the environment is still the Greenpeace case (Case
C-321/95 P). As far as the locus standi of Greenpeace was concerned, the Court
of Justice upheld the view of the Court of First Instance (now General Court)
that an association formed for the protection of the collective interests of a cat-
egory of persons could not be considered to be directly and individually con-
cerned, for the purposes of Article 263(4). Although the CFI, in the Jégo-Quéré
case (Case T-177/01), tried to change this restrictive attitude, the Court itself
made it abundantly clear, in its judgment in case Unión de Pequeños Agricultores
v. Council (Case C-50/00 P.), that any changes should be the result of amending
the EU treaties.
In short, if more direct access is required, then this must be arranged via the
front door (amending the treaty), rather than by secretly introducing access via
the backdoor of court interpretation according to the CJEU. And, for that matter,
there is also a national court that can be addressed. The ‘invitation’ to arrange
the issue, ‘via the front door’, as we all know, has only been included half-
heartedly in the Lisbon Convention and has not resulted in any substantial
widening or improvement.
In 2012 the CFI made another attempt. It found, in an appeal for annulment
brought by a number of environmental organisations, that Regulation 1367/2006
was incompatible with the Convention of Aarhus. That Convention, to which
the EU is also party, requires in Art. 9(3) that parties including environmental
organisations ‘have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge
acts and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene
provisions of its national law relating to the environment’. Because the access
to the court was almost completely cut off after the UPA judgment had been
given, the European legislator believed that it could remain ‘in compliance with
Aarhus’ by creating some kind of objection procedure (viz. internal review by
the institution that took the decision) in the above-mentioned Regulation. The
only problem was that in that Regulation, and certainly in the manner in which
it was applied by the Council and the Commission, the Plaumann approach
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was imported. In short: there was still no question of real access to an ‘admin-
istrative’ procedure within the meaning of the Aarhus Convention.
The CFI had found, and in my view perfectly rightly so, that the Regulation
was in violation of Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention. However, the problem
that the CFI was faced with was that the CJEU, in an earlier judgment
(Slovak Brown Bears, Case C-240/09), had already held that precisely that pro-
vision had no direct affect. In an attempt to attach legal consequences to the
violation of that article of the Convention nevertheless, the CFI ‘worked magic’
and conjured up the rather obscure Fediol/Nakajima exception (Cases 70/87
and 69/89). According to the CFI that exception allowed it to test the validity
of an act of the European Union against the rules of an international agreement,
even if these rules had no direct effect. This would apply in cases where the
European Union intends to implement a specific obligation within the scope
of that agreement or if secondary legislation refers to specific provisions of that
agreement. Brave, but perhaps destined to fail. In the Vereniging Milieudefensie
and Stichting Natuur en Milieu cases, the CJEU needed only a few words to point
to the special factual and legal context of Fediol and Nakajima and found that
this approach could not just simply be ‘transplanted’ to the Aarhus Convention.
This means that we are back to square one: Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Conven-
tion cannot achieve a better legal protection position for environmental organ-
isations after all, at least not in so far as it concerns legal protection against
decisions of the European institutions themselves.
How to proceed? The fact that Article 10(1) of Regulation 1367/2006 is in
violation of Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention still seems evident to me. After
all, the Regulation wrongly restricts access to the internal review procedure to
individual administrative acts. However, this problem cannot be solved by the
European courts. Art. 9(3) Aarhus Convention has no direct effect nor can it
be raised as an exception of illegality against European Regulations and Direc-
tives.
I no longer have much faith in the fact that the EU legal order will appear
to be able to start acting in conformity with the Aarhus Convention at short
notice in this file. Perhaps further pressure from ‘outside’, by which I mainly
mean from the compliance mechanism of the Aarhus Convention itself, could
result in some improvement in the longer term. As long as that does not happen,
the conclusion must unfortunately be that the issue of access to justice has in
the meantime been fairly well provided for in most EU member-states , but
that the EU itself is gradually becoming known as the proverbial black sheep.
‘Who is afraid of the Aarhus Convention? We are, George, we are.’.
This ‘special issue’ of REALaw ‘Proceduralisation of EU law through the back-
door’ is the result of a workshop held at Maastricht University in 2014. Dr.
Mariolina Eliantonio and Dr. Elise Muir organised the workshop and edited
the papers presented there. In recent years, there has been a bourgeoning of
legislative initiatives as well as legislative rules placing emphasis on judicial
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enforcement and remedies across several EU policies. Examples include the
debate on the implementation of the Aarhus Convention as well as several in-
struments in the fields of EU competition and consumer protection law.
This process is remarkable in so far as it leads to the setting of standards
concerned with access to justice and judicial remedies in the context of a sub-
stantive EU policy. Indeed, these standards are not introduced as a result of the
exercise by the EU of its competences in the field of judicial cooperation in civil
matters (or even criminal matters) but on the basis of a distinct substantive
policy of the EU.
The resulting procedural rules illustrate the tension between the existence
of a substantive EU competence and the lack of an explicit corresponding pro-
cedural competence. Yet, a concern for the ‘effet utile’ or effectiveness of a
substantive EU competence combined with the wish to ensure an effective
remedy against breaches of EU law (see Art. 47 CFEU) leads the EU legislature
to adopt procedural rules that are deemed necessary for the coming into effect
of the substantive competences.
The presence of procedural rules enshrined in EU substantive law is not
new as will be explained in the first contribution to this special issue by Prof.
dr. Olivier Dubos. Its effects on national administrative law are well explored.
Nevertheless, its impact on judicial processes (in contrast to administrative
practices) at domestic level have been subject to little investigation to date al-
though the extent of the phenomenon in recent years is unprecedented; hence
the focus of this special issue on procedural rules applicable before national
courts.
Such an observation calls for two central research questions. At ‘micro’ level,
are these developments coherent within a policy or across comparable EU
policies? This will be examined in each of the articles submitted that focus on
selected EU policies (competition, consumer protection, public procurement,
environmental law, data protection and anti-discrimination). At ‘macro’ level,
does this trend tell us anything important about the evolution of the EU legal
order? This question will be addressed by Mariolina Eliantonio and Elise Muir
and brings together the observations made by all contributors in an analytical
way.
In addition to those ‘Maastricht’ articles, this volume of REALaw concludes
with a most interesting contribution of Prof. dr. Ferdinand Wollenschläger on
EU Law Principles for Allocating Scarce Goods in which he identifies substantive
and procedural requirements for developing a new type of administrative pro-
cedure.
Jan H. Jans
3Review of European Administrative Law 2015-1
REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; VOL. 8, NR. 1, 3-3, PARIS LEGAL PUBLISHERS © 2015
